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IS TIFFT v. PORTER MODIFIED, OR ARE BEQUESTS
OF CLOSELY HELD STOCK AN EXCEPTION TO IT?
VICTOR S. MERSCHt

IN THE past decade

there has been an interesting sequence of decisions
courts
of New York which have held that a bequest
in the lower
of stock of a family or closely held corporation, which stock is shown
to have been held by the testator at the date of his will and retained
by him until his death, is a specific bequest, although the testator in
his will did not refer to "my stock," nor otherwise similarly identify it.
These cases warrant consideration because of the dearth of authority
elsewhere concerning bequests of stocks of family corporations,1 which
today have become so common. Consideration of these cases is necessary, moreover, because they have given rise to the question whether
Tifft v. Porter,2 long a leading and influential case in this state and
throughout the country, has, or has not, been overruled. Surrogates have
differed on the question. And one Department of the Appellate Division,
in an obiter dicta, three years ago, took the indefinite position that the
authority of Tifft v. Porter "is seriously impaired, if not destroyed, by
In re Security Trust Company of Rochester.""a In construing stock bequests it is a matter of some importance to know whether the authority
of Tifft v. Porter has been destroyed; and, if not, whether it has been
impaired; and, if it has, to what extent? What does Tifft v. Porter
stand for today? Do the courts correctly appraise what Tift v. Porter
stood for originally? Is Tifft v. Porter modified, or are bequests of
closely held stock an exception to it?
In Tifft v. Porter the testator left 240 shares of the stock of the
Cayuga County Bank to his wife, and 120 shares of the stock of the
same bank to another legatee. According to the statement of facts, the
testator owned just 360 shares of this stock at his death; and, as the
court in its opinion discusses exclusively possession by testator of this
stock at date of his will, they evidently inferred or assumed this second
fact from proof of the first.4 Nevertheless, these legacies were held to
t

Deputy Register of Wills, Probate Court, District of Columbia.
1. But three reported cases on the point have been found outside of New York. New
Albany Trust Co. v. Powell, 29 Ind. App. 494, 64 N. E. 640 (1902) is in accord with the
New York cases, and is quoted below, p. 000, n. 30. Cumming's Estate, 12 Pa. Co. Rep.
45 (1892); Yerkes Estate, 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 83 (1894) are both contra; and are criticized
infra, note 70. In Burnett v. Heinrichs, 95 N. J. Eq. 112, 122 Atl. 681 (1923) testator
held all the stock, apparently, and the bequests were held specific; but upon general principles, indicated note 15, infra.
2. 8 N. Y. 516 (1853).
3. In re Filor's will, 244 App. Div. 858, 279 N. Y. Supp. 784 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd
without opinion, 268 N. Y. 674, 198 N. E. 553 (1935).
4. It seems curiously to have been generally overlooked, that, according to the statement
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be general, and these legatees were denied income on the stock after
testator's death. The crux of the case appears in this language from
the opinion:
"A legacy is general, when it is so given as not to amount to a bequest of a
particular thing or money of the testator distinguished from all others of the
same kind. It is specific, when it is a bequest of a specified part of the testator's
personal estate which is so distinguished.
"In those cases in which legacies of stocks or shares in public funds have been
held to be specific, some expression has been found from which an intention
to makie the bequest of the particular shares of stock could be inferred. Where,
for instance, the testator has used such language as, 'my shares,' or any other
equivalent designation, it has been held sufficient. But the mere possession
larger amount
by the testator at the date of the will (sic) of stock of equal, or
0
than the legacy, will not of itself make the bequest specific." G
7
Thus the court embraced "the arbitrary and iron-clad English rule,"
and in time that case of Tift v. Porterbecame the fountain head of the
same rule elsewhere in this country.' But while those paragraphs state
the gist of the opinion, embodying the rule governing the decision, what
other courts have most often quoted is the following classic expression,
stating what has been deemed "the reason" for the rule:

"The inclination of the courts to hold legacies to be general, rather than specific,
and on which the rule is based that to make a legacy specific, its terms must
dearly require such a construction, rests upon solid grounds. The presumption
is stronger that a testator intends some benefit to a legatee, than that he intends
a benefit only upon the collateral condition that he shall remain, till death,
owner of the property bequeathed. The motives which ordinarily determine
men in selecting legatees, are their feelings of regard, and the presumption
of course is that their feelings continue and they are looked upon as likely to
continue. An intention of benefit being once expresed, to make its taking
of facts in Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516 (1853), decedent's posses-on of the stock in that
case was shown only as of his death, while the opinion there, by contrast, discuses exclusively possession as of the date of his will, adding "Davis v. Cain, 1 Iredell Eq. R. 309
and Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515 are directly in point." Thus in Tifft v. Porter, the

court inferred or assumed possession at date of will from proof of posse-son at date of
death. And so, in Matter of Freeman, 139 Misc. 301, 302, 248 N. Y. Supp. 422 (Surr. Ct.
1921), the surrogate says: "In Tifft v. Porter, the testator, at the time of the execution of
his will and also at the time of his death, was the owner of 360 shares of stock of the
Cayuga County Bank.' In Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. (2d) 984 (App. D. C. 1937), the
majority likewise inferred possession at date of will from proof of posse.son at death.
5. See 8 N. Y. 516, 518 (1853).

6. Ibid.
7. The English rule is thus labeled in Matter of Largue, 267 Mo. 104, 114, 183 S. W.
605, 610 (1916), quoted in Matter of Security Trust Co., discu-ssed at p. CCD, infra.
s. Tifft v. Porter is relied on in the leading cases on this point in several states, sce
notes 101 to 105, infra.
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effect turn upon the contingency of the condition of the testator's property
being unchanged, instead of upon the continuance of the same feelings which
in the first instance prompted the selection of the legatee, requires, as it ought,
clear language to convey that intention." 9
In the case before it, the testator had given 240 shares out of the 360
shares he owned to his wife, who claimed the bequest as his widow.
Had the court been writing that opinion in these days of divorce, perhaps the court would have been somewhat less emphatic about the perdurance of the testator's regard for a legatee. Surely in these days a
stock bequest to a friend, a servant, or other employee is not necessarily
evidence of an enduring bond of affection. However, the language thus
used by the court was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States,' and is still being quoted." Tifft v. Porterbecame, and is today
a leading case, a landmark. And while its influence thus extended beyond
New York, within the State it remained unimpaired as late as 1915,
when Surrogate Schultz held a bequest of certain stock, "which shares
were in his (testator's) possession both at the time of the execution of
his will and at his death" to be general and not specific, citing Tifft v.
Porter,and further saying: "The question is not a new one and I believe
is no longer debatable." 2
Two years later, in 1917, the Court of Appeals decided Matter of
Security Trust Company of Rochester. 8 This case seems to have attracted no attention at the time, and, as will appear, its force was
apparently not appreciated for ten years; and its full significance is not
generally known and recognized even today. The testator, who had been
an original incorporator of Kee Lox Mfg. Co., owned, both at the date
of his will and at the date of his death, 2024 shares (together, he and
two others owned 4150 shares) of the 5000 shares issued by that company. To a sister he bequeathed "$5000 also 200 shares of stock of the
Kee Lox Mfg. Co.;" to a second sister he bequeathed the same, and the
balance of said stock was bequeathed among eighteen other legatees in
various amounts. Although the bequests to the sisters were thus of cash
and stock,' 4 this was not noted by the court in its opinion. However,
9. See 8 N. Y. 516, 521 (1853).
10. See Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 608 (1900).
11. The most recent quotation is in the majority opinion in Vogel v. Saundevs, 92 F.
(2d) 984 (App. D. C. 1937).
12. See Matter of Werle's Will, 91 Misc. 398, 401, 155 N. Y. Supp. 262, 264 (1915).
13. 221 N. Y. 213, 116 N. E. 1006 (1917) aff'g 178 App. Div. 909, 164 N. Y. Supp.
1113 (4th Dep't 1917).
14. Combining bequests of cash and of stock to the same legatee has been held enough
to show an intent to make the stock bequest specific. Kermode v. Macdonald, L. R. 3 Ch.
584 (1868); Douglas v. Douglas, 13 App. D. C. 21, 26 IV. L. R. 331 (1898); Metcalf v.
First Parish, 128 Mass. 370 (1880); contra: Estate of McGaw, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 545
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bequest of the balance of the stock, after the gifts to the sisters, might
have been relied upon to make their respective legacies specific; and
there is an oblique reference to this rule. 8 But there were still other indications in the will that sufficiently showed "an intention to give to the
legatees named the specific stock which the testator held in the Kee Lox
Mlfg. Co. at the date of his will and at the time of his death.""0
Here, then, was ample basis for the court to decide that the legacies
involved in the case before them for decision were specific legacies, without remotely infringing upon the holding in Tifft v. Porter. Moreover,
the court might readily have done, in terms, what later surrogate opinions
have held was done anyway,17 namely, the court might have distinguished
the case before it as concerning stock of a privately owned corporation,
whereas Tifft v. Porter involved "stocks or shares in public funds."
Though the court said nothing inconsistent with this theory, and in fact
supported it by implication, (by the discussion and emphasis of the above
facts as to testator's relationship to the close corporation), still, they
did not directly adopt it. s
And certainly they did not directly impair or challenge Tift v. Porter.
They do say that Tift v. Porter "goes no further than to hold that a
gift of stock is a general legacy when there is nothing in the will to
indicate that it is a gift of the testator's stock; "s they proceed to quote
the second paragraph quoted above from Tifft v. Porter; and then they
add:
"The law is not so unscientific as to insist upon the use of the word 'my'
(1925). And in Douglas v. Douglas, supra, there were additional words which materially
aided the court in construing the bequest as specific, and adeemed.
15. Unitarian Society v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 23 N. E. 1006 (1890), is cited and briefly
stated with the comment that the Massachusetts court found nothing in Tifft v. Porter

inconsistent with their holding, in applying said rule. But the 'rule there folloved is not
stressed, nor does the court in the Security Company case seem to rely on it, except collaterally or cumulatively. See also, Millard v. Bailey, L. R. 1 Eq. 378 (1836). Compave
In re W'Tlicocks, 2 Ch. 327 (1921).
16. See Matter of Security Trust, 221 N. Y. 213, 219, 116 N. E. 1005, 1003 (1917).
For paying debts testator directed that cash be used and, if insufficient, "any stocks or
bonds which I may hold in corporations other than the Key Lox Mfg. Co. and Crown
Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. shall be sold and the proceeds applied upon said debts." By
another clause he bequeathed "all my stock and interest in the Crown Ribbon & Carbon
Mfg. Co."

17. Freeman's Will, 139 Misc. 301, 302, 243 N. Y. Supp. 422 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
1S. Neither does the court point out that, in the case before it, poszecson of the stock
was shown both as of "the date of the will" and the date of death, and thus distinguish
Tifft v. Porter, upon the facts. See note 4, supra; and note 63, infra.
19. See 221 N. Y. 213, 219, 116 N. E. 1006, 1007 (1917). This authoritative interpretation of Tifft v. Porter, does not mention the "presumption" so much emphasized in that
case. See quotation, p. 000, supra. It also leaves the way open for evidence of attendant
circumstances, respecting the stock, in construing the will.
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when other words may clearly
indicate the intention of the testator to give
' 20
shares then in his ownership."
The crux of Tifft v. Porter is retained: There still must be "words"
to indicate the testator's intention. But the fact of possession, the fact
that shares corresponding to the bequest are "then in his ownership" is
given weight, consideration, and importance quite inconsistent (on that
single point) with the entire opinion in the early precedent. This is
made quite clear (and the court points the way which the lower courts
later followed) in the further content of the opinion in Matter of Security
Trust Company, in which the Court of Appeals goes outside its own
cases, to find the principles upon which to base its decision.
Thus, for instance, the 'Court of Appeals quotes from Matter of
Largue:21 "Many of the courts of last resort have broken away from
the arbitrary and iron-clad English rule" and construe legacies of stock
specific "without the use of 'my' or any similar expression, when the
will upon its face fairly discloses the intention of the testator to make
a specific bequest." And from Ferreck's Estate2 the court quotes, "the
fact that the testator had the number of shares so given, though not
controlling, is significant." They quote also from Thayer v. Paulding,-'
"a very slight indication of an intention to give shares then in his ownership is enough to make the legacy specific in a case like this." The
24
court even indulged in the whimsy of discussing a hypothetical case,
namely, what would have happened if the testator had owned a less
number of shares of this stock at death? They answer: "In Drake,
Adm'r v. True, 72 N. H. 322, such a situation was met by dividing
the stock left by the testatrix proportionately among the legatees.""6
These citations by the New York Court of Appeals represented a
substantial roll call from the states which have never been in entire
accord with Tifft v. Porter.2 6 This endorsement of the language and the
thought of the other courts (in support of the decision then being made
in the Security Trust Company case) constituted a peculiar yet devastating attack upon Tifft v. Porter. While the holding or ruling in the
20. See 221 N. Y. 213, 220, 116 N. E. 1006,,1008 (1917).
21. 267 Mo. 104, 114, 183 S. W. 608, 610 (1916).
22. 241 Pa. 340, 88 At. 505 (1913).
23. 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868 (1908).
24. Similar tactics by the majority in Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. (2d) 984 (App. D. C.
1937), met sharp criticism from the mino -ity.
25. 221 N. Y. 213, 221, 116 N. E. 1006, 1008 (1917).
26. In Martin, Petitioner, 25 R. I. 1, 16, 54 At]. 589, 595 (1903), the court held a
stock bequest specific without "my" and in the opinion said: "Undoubtedly the fact of
the testatrix having an odd number of shares of the Ashland Cotton Company at the date
of her death, exactly coyresponding with the number given away, was a circumstance to
be taken into account. .. .
27. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 713 (1875) presents an interesting parallel. There, like-
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case is not impugned, the broad scope of the opinion in Tifft v. Porter
is definitely circumscribed; the rule that courts favor general legacies,
the "presumption" that legacies are general, and "the reason" for the
said presumption, 8 enunciated and elaborated in Tifft v. Porter, are
curtailed and limited in application. The manner in which this was done,
however, has caused doubt and confusion in the lower courts. Some of
them have relied upon Matter of Security Trust Company as discrediting
Tifft v. Porter.
The first of these decisions came in In re Strasenburgh'sWill? 0 The
testator bequeathed 400 shares of the capital stock of a corporation
founded and controlled by him, to each of two business associates, and
4000 shares of the same corporation to a son. He "at all times" had
stock in excess of this, one certificate being for 400 shares, but none for
4000 shares, except by combining three certificates. Upon an issue as
to whether dividends declared during the year of administration should
go to these legatees or to the residuary legatee, Surrogate Feeley held
the bequests to be specific. He gives an entirely sufficient reason for
his holding, in this paragraph:
"In the will he does not say 'my' shares.... Yet any testator, if he mentions
a particular thing generally, means to give what he then has of that kind;
and if it be ascertained that at his death he had on hand the exact amount
of stock shares which he gave by such legacies, this fact alone, 'though not
controlling, is significant.' Being shares in his own business, run by him down
until about the date of the will, almost as a one-man company, these shares
were not offered to the public, but were closely held, by him and his wife...
and the rest being in the hands of his trusted business associates, mentioned
in the will, and some small lots held by employees, it is not likely he referred
in the will to shares thereafter to be acquired either by him or by his executor;
but intended those he then had and later kept.... In this regard the observation of an Indiana court is pertinent: 'If it appears that the testator knew that
he alone owned a sufficient amount of stock to satisfy a legacy, when stock
is devised, such legacy will be regarded as specific, because the will must

necessarily have referred to the shares owned by the testator.' New Albany
Trust Co. v. Powell, 29 Ind. App. 494, 500."

0

This last thought had first been expressed in an earlier and more
wise, after showing a complete and adequate basis for its decision in recognized precedents,
the court went on to discuss additional )reasons (contra to the English precedents) which
the court treated as a concomitant and independently sufficient basis of its decision. Scathing criticism of this latter "dictum" was published by Professor John Chipman Gray and

obtained wide circulation. Yet the courts followed the "dictum"; and it thus became "the
greatest single factor in the establishment of spendthrift trusts" in the United States. See
GatsworLD, SPEN'Dnr
Thusrs (1937) 25, reviewed, (1937) 25 GEo. L. J.512.
28. See particularly quotation from Tifft v. Porter, p. 365, sutpa.
29. 136 Misc. 91, 242 N. Y. Supp. 453 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
30. See id., 96, 97, 242 N. Y. Supp. at 460, 461.
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celebrated opinion in the Surrogate's own state. In Matter of Hastings"'
the testator had bequeathed among five legatees in unequal amounts a
total of 45 shares of capital stock of a certain association; so much was
found among his assets, and, it appearing that testator kniw he alone
possessed enough shares of this stock to satisfy these bequests, they were
held specific, the court saying:
"If a bequest of stock 'standing in my name' or of 'my' stock is specific, how
can it fairly be claimed that a bequest of stock which is only procurable,
as
32
the testator knows, by a resort to his assets, lacks the specific quality?"
But in the Strasenburgh case, the Surrogate did not rely upon this
reasoning alone. He undertook further to distinguish the early landmark,
saying:
"Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516, by a majority of one vote, laid down the rule
that a gift of stock is a general legacy when there is nothing in the will to
indicate that it is a gift of testator's stock.... Today no one doubts the right
of the court to go outside the will to resolve a doubt about a legacy being
specific" etc.33
The Surrogate met and rejected other objections, also, saying:
"In such a case replevin ceases to be a universal test of a legacy being specific,
because until allotment in certificate, the legatee could not identify, by the
language of the will, any particular shares as his own bequest. Ademption also,
in such cases, ceases to be a complete test, in itself, of the specific nature of
31. (a) 6 Dem. Surr. 307 (N. Y. 1887). This is a noteworthy opinion. It considers
both the authority contra, and the preliminary question of evidence, as to whether the
facts respecting the corporation and its stock may be shown. (b) In Ashton v. Ashton, Cas.
tern. Tal. 152, 25 Eng. Rep. 712 (1735) the court said that if it were proven that stock
of the kind bequeathed was not purchasable, that would be "a very strong circumstance
for saying that the testator intended to give that which he then had." (c) See Robinson
v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515, 520 (1840) where the decision was contra, involved stock of a corporation having 2600 shares which "though not frequently sold are nevertheless occasionally bought and sold and may be had for money." Both these observations were noted In
Matter of Hastings, 6 Dem. Surr. 307 (N. Y. 1887). (d) In Evans v. Hunter, 86 Iowa 413,
53 N. W. 277 (1892) which involved government bonds and which followed Tifft v.
Porter, the court said: "The question to be determined is whether the requirements of the

will can be satisfied only by delivering to the legatees the bonds which the testator owned
at death." (e) Kunkel v. Macgill, 56 Md. 120 (1880).
32. See 6 Dem. Surr. 307, 329 (N. Y. 1887).
33. See In re Strasenburgh's Will, 136 Misc. 91, 94, 242 N. Y. Supp. 453, 458 (Su'r.
Ct. 1928). The court cites White v. Winchester, 6 Pick. 48 (Mass. 1827); Douglas v.
Douglas, 13 App. D. C. 21 (1898); Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868 (1908);
and Matter of Security Trust Company, 221 N. Y. 213, 116 N. E. 1006 (1917). See
Matte& of Hastings, note 32, supra. That "parole evidence of the state and value of a
testator's funded property is admissible in order to determine whether a legacy is specific
or general", see Boys v. Williams, 2 Russ. & My. 689, 694, 39 Eng. Rep. 557, 559 (1831);
Atty. Gen. v. Grote, 2 Russ. & My. 690, 39 Eng. Rep. 561 (1827).
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the legacy, where the ademption is partial only, and the units in the mass are

uniform and of equal value. ' *4

He conceded that it would be impossible, if only part of this stock
had been disposed of by the testator, to say whose shares were adeemed,
and added:
"For all that, there can, apparently, be a gift of a particular fraction of a
particular thing, such as corporate shares, without any implied substitution in
cash if enough be not on hand at death to meet the call of the will. ' 'z3
Thereafter the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Will of Catherine
MartinY6 On June 11, 1924, she owned and exchanged forty shares
preferred stock of the Niagara Falls Power Company, par $100 per share,
for one hundred and sixty shares, par $25 per share. Later, in September,
1925, she executed her will, giving her sister "the interest on 40 shares
of stock of the Niagara Falls Power Co. while she lives," then over to a
hospital. She mentioned the par value of the stock as $100 per share;
she also bequeathed some cash to her sister; and she gave the residue
"including all Power Company stock not mentioned above" to the Salvation Army. She died still owning the stock received in the above
exchange. The Surrogate held the sister took (for life) one hundred and
sixty shares of the par $25 stock as a general legacy; the Appellate
Division held that she took (for life) forty shares of the par $25 stock,
as a specific legacy. The Court of Appeals decided that she took (for
life) one hundred and sixty shares of the part $25 stock, as a specific
legacy. As noted above, the joining of a bequest of cash with a bequest
of stock to the same legatee is sometimes supposed to evidence sufficiently an intent to make the stock bequest specific;"' and, secondly,
the gift of the residue of a named stock is often deemed enough to make
34.

See In re Strasenburgh's Will, 136 Misc. 91, 93, 242 N. Y. Supp. 453, 462 (Surr.

CL 1928). Considering a bequest of the contents of a safe deposit box, in In re Low, 103
N. J. Eq. 435, 442, 143 At. 222, 225 (1923), the court said: "In Parrott v. Wor-ford, 1 Jac.
& W. 594, it was said that the liability to adempion was an unfailing test of the character
of the legacy... the inevitable consequence of ademption had this box been found empty at
testators death, compels the conclusion that the legacy is specific." Compare: Matter of
Fisher, 93 App. Div. 186, 37 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1904), where contents of such
box were bequeathed to several legatees in specified proportions. See (1914) 14 CoL L.
RFv. 74, 75, note 11.
35. See In re Strasenburgh's Will, 136 Misc. 91, 98, 242 N. Y. Supp. 453, 462 (Surr. CL
1928). The court then mentions the Security Trust Co. case quoting Dra e v. True, 72
N. H. 322, 56 At. 749 (1903); Elwyn v. DeGormendia, 143 Md. 109, 123 AtL 913 (1925);
Matter of De Bernal's Will, 165 Cal. 223, 131 Pac. 375 (1913); see, also, Davis v. Crandal,
101 N. Y. 311, 4 N. E. 721 (1886).
36. 225 App. Div. 724, 231 N. Y. Supp. 813 (1st Dep't 192S); 252 N. Y. 532, 170 N.
E. 151 (1929).
37. See note 14, supra.
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a preceding bequest of stock of the same company specific."' But these
considerations were not relied upon in Matter of Security Trust Company;39 nor in this case. Although the' reference to par value, in the
will of testatrix, did not conform to, and hence did not accurately
describe the stock she owned,4 the memorandum opinion and decision
in Matter of Martin's Will has been construed, in subsequent Surrogate
decisions, as dependent solely upon the fact that testatrix owned the
stock which was held to pass under her bequest, both at the time of her
will and at the date of her death.4 1
Thus interpreted, Matter of Martin's Will would overrule the holding
in Tifft v. Porter. This seems far-fetched. What the Court of Appeals
did not do in the Security Trust Company case, they surely would not
do in a memorandum opinion later in Matter of Martin. But Matter
of Martin exhibits the reach of the Security Trust Company opinion.
Matter of Martin emphasizes pointedly the new importance of possession
of the stock, and the relative unimportance of the "words" necessary
to make the bequest specific. In Matter of Martin, as also in Security
Trust Company case, there was a gift of a balance of the stock, following gifts of shares of stock of the same kind; the words of these bequests
would serve to satisfy the requirement that there be "words" to evidence
an intent to make specific a bequest of stock owned by testator.
This may appear more obvious upon consideration of a recent decision
in the District of Columbia, wherein Tifft v. Porter was quoted and
distinguished by the majority, and was relied upon in the dissent."
Testatrix bequeathed 14 shares of American Telegraph & Telephone
Company stock, without using "my" or any equivalent designation, to
a woman to whom she referred as "my dear friend and companion" and
to whom she made other bequests. At her death testatrix owned no stock
other than ten shares of the stock of that company. To satisfy creditors
it became necessary either to sell this stock, or to sell realty passing
under the residuary clause. The legatee opposed sale of the stock,
contending it was specifically bequeathed, and she was sustained by the
court. The majority opinion quotes and adopts the reason assigned in
38. Note 15, supra.
39.

See p. 368, supra.

40. Whether a specific legacy of stock is adeemed by a change in the subject matter
between the date of the will and testator's death, depends on whether the change is substantial or merely formal. Matter of Brann, 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E. 404 (1916); First
Nat. Bank v. Union Hospital, 281 Mass. 64, 183 N. E. 247 (1932). This rule was In.
applicable in Matter of Martin's Will, since the exchange was made prior to the execution

of the will, but a similar attitude towards the legacy was displayed by the Surrogate and
by the Court of Appeals.
41. See Matter of Tyler.

42. Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. (2d) 984 (App. D. C. 1937).
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Tifft v. Porter4 3 for the rule that "courts are generally averse to construing legacies to be specific." But they then proceed to say: "The
reason for applying the rule is absent in this instance."44 Further they
say that, if testatrix had left no shares of stock of this company,--"In
that case the courts would be loathe to construe the legacy as specific,
and hold that it had been adeemed. But that situation does not exist
here." 45
In short, the continued possession of the stock by testatrix is a vital
factor in deciding whether the bequest is specific or not. In such case,
the reason stated in Tifft v. Porter for the rule adopted there, does not
apply.
The holding in Tifft v. Porter is not thus evaded, nor violated. Possession solely is still not enough. Some expression must be found, in the
four corners of the will, to make the bequest specific. But, when the
stock has been retained (and the legatee need not be saved the consequence of ademption) then any words whatsoever should suffice to avoid
the judicial inference favoring equality among legatees, and to make the
bequest specific. Most of the New York cases, beginning with Matter
of Security Trust Company, and including Matter of Martin, are in
harmony with this theory of Vogel v. Saunders. This will appear, by
contrast, later, when discussing the cases which are not in accord.
Eleven years had elapsed between the Security Trust Company case
in 1917 and the Strasenburgh case in 1928, which was the first decision
construing the Security Trust Company case as establishing a departure
from Tifft v. Porter. But after the Court of Appeals had again spoken
in Matter of Martin's Will, in 1929, there were-just two years laterthree opinions, by different Surrogates, almost simultaneously, dealing
with like problems. The first of these to be considered is In re Mitchell's
Estate." "Life" was founded by John A. Mitchell, testator, and Andrew
Mill, in 1882. In 1892 it was incorporated, testator receiving 750 shares,
and Miller the other 250 shares, which each retained until testator's
death, when the business was worth a million dollars. Mitchell bequeathed 180 shares outright among his sister, his cousin and three
business associates. The remaining 570 shares he gave in trust to his
widow for life, then to several associates, including the above three.
In referring to these 570 shares, he authorized the trustees "to retain
all of my said 570 shares." The executors considered this gift specific,
and the gift of 180 shares general. As to the 180 shares, testator provided that the children of a predeceased legatee would take the parent's
43.
44.
45.
46.

See S N. Y. 516, 521 (1853).
See 92 F. (2d) 984, 986 (App. D. C. 1937).
Ibid.
114 ?,isc. 370, 186 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Surr. CL. 1921).
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portion, "or if any of such legatees should leave no children surviving
me, then, I give and bequeath the same to his or her next of kin in
equal shares, per stirpes and not per capita." Disposition of the income
on the stock during the period of administration (a dividend of $100 per
share) was the only matter in issue. Testator's use of the word "my"
(above) was seized upon in aid of the construction that the legacies
in the 180 share group were specific as well as those in the 570 share
group. Yet the case exhibits the spirit of Matter of Security Trust
Company, to which the Surrogate compares it, and from which he quotes
copiously:
'"The indications of intent in this will are just as strong as those in Matter of
Security Trust Co. The stock of the Life Publishing Co. was not publicly dealt
in. The corporation here was even a closer one, with but two stockholders....
Mr. Mitchell must have known that his executors would not be able to replace
the stock bequeathed by him in case he disposed of it, in whole or part, during
his lifetime. His will disposes of the exact number of shares owned by him at
the time it was executed. At his death he possessed the same amount of stock.
The legatees here were favored relatives and business associates who apparently
had helped to make the business successful. His intention was plainly to give
them an immediate interest. Moreover, he provided for a complete disposition
of the stock to the children or next of kin of the legatees, in case anyone predeceased him. . . .For these reasons the legatees are entitled to the specific
shares, and
to a pro rata distribution of the dividend of $18,000., but without
47
interest."
The holding in Tifft v. Porter is to be followed in a clear case, however. When the stock bequeathed is not that of a close corporation, the
fact of ownership of the stock by testator at the time of making his will
does not alone make the gift specific. And, if the stock has not been
retained, the legatee will be spared the consequence of ademption, by
requiring clear words to show an intent to make the bequest specific.
Thus, in Freeman's Will,48 the testator had made a bequest of 38
shares of stock in various corporations, which he owned at the date of
his will; but during his life, he had disposed of shares of like description
and amount. The executor relied upon the Security Trust Co. case to
obtain a construction that this bequest was specific and so adeemed.
But Surrogate Wingate, held the bequest general, which saved the bequest for the legatee. The decision is amply supported by authority."
But the opinion is quite interesting. The Surrogate harkens back to
Matter of Werle's Will, with its expression that "The question .. .is
no longer debatable." He insists "that the general rule stated in Tifit
47. See id., 372, 374, 186 N. Y. Supp. at 667, 668 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
48. 139 Misc. 301, 248 N. Y. Supp. 422 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
49. With Tifft v. Porter and Matter of Werle's Will, see Matter of Van Vilet, 5 Misc.
169, 25 N. Y. Supp. 722 (Surr. Ct. 1893), and note 62 (c), infra.
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v. Porter is firmly established in the jurisprudence of this state."-"
Yet he takes cognizance of the schism, and eloquently supports it so far
as it concerns bequests of closely held stock. Referring to Tift v. Porter,
he says:
"The ruling is by express terms limited to 'legacies in stocks or shares in public
funds' which in modem parlance is the equivalent of stocks or bonds dealt in
by the general public. The decisions in the Security Trust Company, Strasenburgh, Mitchell, and similar cases all concerned shares in closely held concerns.
"The securities in enterprises commonly purchased and sold by the general
public frequently differ in no essential particular from currency. This is especially common with such securities as Liberty bonds. On the other hand, where
the stocks bequeathed represent complete or partial control of a personal,
closely held, private enterprise, it is obvious that different considerations prevail. In such a case, a gift of the controlling shares amounts virtually to a
gift of the business. If, therefore, the testator has in his lifetime disposed of
such indicia of ownership a determination that the executors in such a case
should be required to go out and repurchase them, or the business which they
represent, would be a palpable absurdity, placing the estate at the absolute
mercy of the individual who, at the moment, possessed control. Such absurdities
will not be indulged by the courts, but their refusal so to do in no wise invalidates the rule of Tifft v. Porter, which does not purport to cover such
circumstances." 5 '
Thus by dictum the Surrogate interprets the Sccurity Trust Com-'
pany case as an "exception" to Tifft v. Porter,and as concerning merely
cases on bequests of closely held stock.Y2 But the Court of Appeals did
not confine themselves to that ratio decedendi. That simple basis for
the decision in Security Trust Company, would leave the memorandum
opinion in Matter of Martin without support; whereas, it must depend
upon Matter of Security Trust Company.
Freeman'sWill was rightly decided. It fell within the holding in Tifft
v. Porter. Sufficient support for this holding, however, lies in the fact
that courts favor general legacies: primarily, to save the legatee the
50. See p. 366, supra.
51. See 139 Misc. 301, 304, 24S N. Y. Supp. 422, 426, 427 (Surr. CL 1921).
52. The Surrogate says, also, "While the Court of Appeals in the Security Trust Company case reaches a result differing from that in Tifft v. Porter as a consequence of the
essentially unlike circumstances, there is nothing therein decided or implied which impairs
its authority. This fact is further emphasized by its express adherence thereto in Matter
of Lendle, 250 N. Y. 502. It is simply a case of differing legal principles being applicable
to diverse states of fact." (p. 305). But the court in the Security Trust casE did not
rest its decision upon any diverse state of facts! See notes 9-17, supra. And Lendle's
Estate involved no question of specific legacy. The nature of that case, and its only
reference to Tift v. Porter, are indicated in this quotation: "The bequests vee of German
marks which are to be regarded, not as a measure of value, but as a commodity. They are
like a gener-al bequest of stock or bonds, to be satisfied ir kind. Tifit v. Porter, 3 N. Y.
516; Evans v. Hunter, 86 Iowa 413, 53 N. W. 277. ....
1
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consequences of ademption, when that is necessary; and, secondarily, to
preserve equality among legatees, when the first object is unnecessary.
The first object works in the legatee's favor; the second work to his
detriment; yet both objects are intended to conform to a presumed
intent of all testators. 3 When the court in Tifft v. Porter went beyond
this arbitrary basis of judicial presumption, and undertook to assign a
"reason" for the presumption, and to base it upon actual inference,
(philosophizing about testator's affection for the legatee outlasting his
tenure of the stock)54 they could not have intended to do more than
put a foundation under the presumption. They were not expanding, nor
enlarging, the presumption. Hence the "reason" for the presumption
should not be used to tag a legacy as general, whenever there is no
occasion for the presumption itself. Such was the decision of the majority
in Vogel v. Saunders. 5 Consider also the next case in this regard.
In the case of Matter of Liell's Will, Henderson, Surrogate, also had
noted that a departure had been made from Tift v. Porter, and, in a
decision less easily justified, he refused to consider the record before
him as coming within that departure. The testator had bequeathed,
thirteen bonds of Schieffelin & Company, which he owned when his will
was executed and thereafter until his death, among seven legatees. The
question was whether income during the period of administration went
to them, or to the residuary legatees. Holding these stock bequests to
be general, the Surrogate said:
"If this be a specific legacy, the executrix (legatee of eight shares) would
not benefit unless the decedent died possessed of the bonds mentioned in paragraph 'Third' of the will. Was it his desire that she receive a benefit from his
estate in any event or only if the bonds remained his until his death? . . .
Mere possession of the bonds at the date of the execution of the will and at
the date of the testator's death is not sufficient to make a legacy specific. A
specific legacy is a part of the decedent's estate which is distinguishable from
all others of the same kind. (Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516; Matter of Delaney,
133 App. Div. 309). The testator divided the Schieffelin & Co. bonds unequally
among seven legatees but there was no attempt by the testator to point out
any particular Schiefflin bond for any legatee. A specific legacy is a gift of a
particular thing. If the testator had disposed of-one of these bonds in his
lifetime, it would be impossible to determine which of the seven legatees had
lost his legacy or part of his legacy" etc.67
53. If there be any justification or basis for the "reason" why courts favor general
legacies, as given in Tifft v. Porter, note 9, supra, then by parity of reasoning, the
testator must be presumed to have intended the legatee to enjoy half a loaf, rather than
nothing at all. See cases note 70 (a), infra.
54. Quoted note 9, supra, and criticized in text, p. 000, supra.
55. See note 42, supra.
56. 139 Misc. 513, 247 N. Y. Supp. 386 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
57. See id., at 388, 389, 247 N. Y. Supp. at 386.
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"In Matter of Strasenburgh, 139

Iisc. 91, where the language of the will.

is somewhat similar to the instant case and the legacies were held to be specific,
the testator owned a majority of the stock in the company, the shares of which

he bequeathed in his will. It was his corporation and he alone owned a sufficient amount of stock to satisfy the legacies. It is not urged that this condition
exists here. In that case, and in all others that have been called to my attention and that bear upon the present question, either the legacy was given to
one person, or the court found ani intention upon the part of the testator to
make specific gifts."' is

Purporting to recognize but not extend the departure from Tifft v.
Porter,this case actually, in spirit, more closely resembles Tifft v. Porter
than any New York case since Matter of Security Trust Company."

The decision might be considered satisfactory, if it were frankly grounded
upon an arbitrary judicial presumption in favor of equality among

legatees, when the primary judicial presumption intended to avoid ademption is inapplicable. But the court goes back to the "reason" supplied in
Tifft v. Porter;and this case is another instance 0 in which that "reason"
is utterly inapplicable.
In the first place, the court is not called upon to decide whether
testator intended to make a "specific bequest" of stock, whenever it is
58. See id., at 389, 247 N. Y. Supp. at 386.
59. (a) Compare Drake Adm'r. v. True, approved in Security Trust Co., at p. 00
supra. Compare also In re Strasenburgh's Will, quotation above.
(b) In Davie v. Crandal, 101 N. Y. 311, 4 N. E. 721 (1886) a gift to a son of
testator of "the sum of $243.92 a portion of the debt due me from the said Jas. Davis. secured by his notes" was followed by a similar gift to a second son. At the date of the
will and at date of death, testator held a note by Davis for the amount of the two
sums thus bequeathed; and the legacy was held a specific legacy of one-half the note.
See also Estate of Daly, 202 Cal. 284, 260 Pac. 296 (1927); Bost v. Morris, 202 N. C.
34, 161 S. E. 710 (1931). Compare, Jones v. Virginia Trust Co., 142 Va. 229, 128 S. E.
533 (1925); Miller v. Weber, 126 Md. 658, 95 AtL 962 (1915).
(c) The legacy must be distinguishable from tstator's other kinds of Etock. In re
Bonesteel, 265 N. Y. 455, 193 N. E. 268 (1934). Accord, Boston Safe Deposit v. Reed,
229 Mass. 267, 118 N. E. 333 (1918).

(d) But the legacy need not be distinguishable from testator's other stock of the fame
kind. An excellent case note in (1914) 14 CoL. L. Rnv. 74, 75 has this statement:---"The
ares is insufficient to
legacy may be specific although the identification of the particular
separate them from the entire number of the same description in the testator's estate.'
Eckfeldts' Estate, 13 Phil. 202, (Pa. 1879) contra. Mahoney v. Holt, 19 PL L 660, 36
At. 1 (1896); compare, Meyers Executor v. Meyers, 33 Ala. 85 (1858) and although the
property is acquired after the date of the will, Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 Beav. 342,
(1940) and therefore, if to be ascertained at the testators death would not be subject to
ademption. See, Bothamley v. Sherson (1875) L. R. 20 Eq. 302. Compare Wood's Estate,
267 Pa. 462, 110 AUt. 90 (1920); Bost v. Morris, 202 N. C. 34, 161 S. E. 710, (1931).
Mahoney v. Holt, supra, is criticized in (1897) 10 HArv. L. Rxv. 454, citing W=X.Lws,
CAS. 490, 497.
ExEctroas (9th ed.) 1027, 1028. See, also, (190S) 10 A.e.
60. See discussion above concerning Vogel v. Saunders. 92 F. (2d) 984 (App. D. C. 1937)
and Freeman's Will, 139 Misc. 301, 248 N. Y. Supp. 422 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
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.clear that he did intend to bequeath specific stock. 1 Furthermore, the
Strasenburgh case said that "any testator, if he mentions a particular
thing generally, means to give what he then has of that kind."02 The
61. (a) A legacy of "my capital stock of £1,000 in the India Company's stock" Is
specific. Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Bro. C. C. 108, 2 L. C. Eq. 600 (1786). A bequest of
"my East Haddam bank stock" is specific. Brainerd v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. 1, 498 (1844).
A bequest of $5,000 of "my Virginia registered state bonds" is specific. Hood v. Haden, 82
Va. 588 (1886).
(b) In Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. 304 (1875), Jessel, M. R. said: "I think
one may arrive at a tolerably clear idea of what a specific bequest is. In the first place it
is a part of the testator's property ....
In the next place, it must be a part emphatically,
as distinguished from the whole. It must be what has sometimes been called a severed or
distinguished part. . . . But if it satisfy both conditions, that it is a part of the testator's
property itself, and is a part as distinguished from the whole, or from the whole of the
residue, then it appears to me to satisfy everything that is required to treat it as a specific
legacy."
In Sinnott v. Kenaday, 14 App. D. C. 1, 27 W. L. R. 82 (1899), the cofirt said: "If,
therefore, a thing or subject matter be bequeathed in a will by such description as to distinguish it from all other things disposed of by the will, so that it does not remain at
the death of the testator as property embraced in any other bequest made by the will,
it is a specific legacy."
To the same effect, see, Jones v. Virginia Trust Co., 142 Va. 229, 239, 128 S. E. 533,
537 (1927).
62. (a) See note 30, supra, and text p. 000.
(b) Ownership of stock at the execution of the will equivalent in kind and amount
to the stock bequest was alone held enough to make the bequest specific, on the idea that
the testator must have intended to give the stock he had: Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 3 Atk. 120
(1743) ; White v. Winchester, 6 Pick. 48 (Mass. 1827); Cuthbert v. Cuthbert, 3 Yeates
486 (Pa. 1803); New Albany Trust Co. v. Powell, 29 Ind. App. 494, 64 N. E. 640 (1902);
Matter of Hastings, 6 Dem. Sur-. 307, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 420 (1887). See notes 19-20,
supra. See also, Avelyn v. Ward, 1 Ves. Sr. 419, 27 Eng. Rep. 1117 (1749).
(c) Contra: Johnson v. Goss, 128 Mass. 433 (1880). Cf. Palmer v. Palmer, 106 Me.
25, 75 Atl. 130 (1909). Also cases following in this note, and in note 63 (b).
(d) In Davis v. Kane, 1 Iredell 304 (N. C. 1840), the court said that testatov, by a
bequest of 25 shares of bank stock, had not expressed an intent to give the shares he then
owned, and that a conjecture, however plausible, that he intended the stock that he then
held would not render the gift specific.
Lord Eldon, in Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. Sr. 523, 528, 32 Eng. Rep. 211, 213 (1802) sad:
"I have no doubt in private that directing a transfer of stock he means to give what he
has: but there is no case deciding it is specific, without marking the specific thing, the
very corpus . . . (and) unless I can say that his intention was that the legacy should fall
if the stock was parted with, I cannot say he meant the one or the other because he happened to have so much stock at the date of the will, for otherwise there is no legal ground
for that construction."
And, In re. Willcocks, 2 Ch. 327, 329 (1921), testatrix bequeathed an odd amount In
pounds, shilling and pence of a named stock to her father, and the same to her mother,
and "all the remainder of my real and personal estate" to her husband. She owned these
stocks and no others at the date of her will, but sold them thereafter. The court said, "In
Hawkins on Wills, the learned authoi points out that the possession of the particular sum
may be the motive of fixing the amount of the bequest, but yet the testator may intend
to give it in the form of a general legacy." And, upon that reasoning, the bequest Is held
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Security Trust Company case and In re Marti s Estate indicate that
this idea is strengthened whenever the testator retains those very shares

until his death. 3 And, when he does so, it is idle for the court to conjecture whether it was testator's desire that the legatee "receive a benefit
from his estate in any event, or only if the bonds remained his until
his death. '" When the stocks are retained, consideration of any other
situation is "sheer speculation from a hypothetical case."

speaks from

death. 6

s

For the will

At death the testator intends to give the stock he

then still has.
general. The court noted that Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, supra, is contra, and that it was not
cited in Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515, 48 Eng. Rep. 1231 (1340).
(e) By contrast, Rigby, L. J. said in In re Nottage, 1S95, 2 Cl. 657, 664: 'You have
got a long way towards a specific gift if you come to the conclusion that he is trying to
describe something which he has?'
And, in New Albany Trust Co., supra, the court said: "At the time the decedent executed
his will he owned 259 shares of the capital stock of the Madison Gaslight Company, and
it is to be presumed he had that particular stock in mind. While a person might make
a devise of some article of personal property which he did not posses3 at the time, for
he might make provision for its procurement after his death,-yet it would be an unuzual
thing to do, and out of the ordinary."
63. (a) That ownership of stock at the execution of the will and at date of testator's
death of the kind and amount bequeathed, makes the gift specific: Matter of Martin's
Will, supra, Jewell v. Appolonio, 75 N. H. 317, 74 At. 250 (1909); Waters v. Hatch, 131
Mo. 262, 28S, 79 S. W. 916, 923 (1904) ; Martin, Petitioner, 25 R. I. 1, 54 AtL 539 (103) ;
Lewis v. Sedgwick, 223 Ill. 213, 79 N. E. 14 (1906). See also, Metcalf v. Framingham
Parish, 128 Mass. 370, 373 (1330); Mandelle's Estate, 252 Mich. 375, 233 N. W. 230
(1930); Calnane's Estate, 28 S. W. (2nd) 420, 422 (Mo. App. 1930); Griffith v. Adams,
106 Conn. 19, 137 AUt. 20 (1927); Wood's Estate, 267 Pa. 462, 110 At]. 93 (1920); Sherman
v. Riley, 43 R. L 202, 110 AtL 629 (1920); Smith v. Smith, 192 N. C. 637, 135 S. E.
855 (1926).
(b) Contra: Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515 (1840); Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516
(1853); Dryden v. Owings, 49 Md. 356 (1378); Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9 (1K6S);
Corbin v. Mlills, 19 Gratt. 478 (Va. 1369); Sponsler's Appeal, 107 Pa. 95 (183); Yerkes
Estate, 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 83 (1894); Cummings Estate, 12 Pa. Co. Rep. 45 (1892); Bond
v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P. (2d) 311 (1932); Garrabrant v. Callaway, 110 N. J. Eq. 83,
158 At. 830 (1932).
Collections of these cases, with comment critical of the former, and endoring this
latter group of cases will be found in 11 W. &. T. L. C. EQ. 605, 646, 676; (1903) 10
A=s. CAS. 490-499; and (1908) 11 L. R. A. (x.s.) 87.
64. Taken from the above quotation from In re Liell's Will, first paragraph thereof,
line 4. This is the language, also, of the "reason" quoted from Tuift v. Porter, supa.
65. In Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. (2d) 934 (App. D. C. 1937) note 11, supra, the majority
observed that, if testatrix bequeathed stock, and died owning none, "the courts would be
loathe to construe the legacy as specific, and hold that it had been adeemed. But that
situation does not exist here." Earlier in the scame paragrapfi, referring to the rule statcd
in Tifft v. Porter, the majority said: "The reason for applying the rule is ab:nt in this
instance."
66. (a) "In practically all of these United States various statutes are now in force,
the effect of which, with the decisions under them, is that all wills are to be construed,
both as to real and personal property, as if made immediately before the death of the
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The notion that a testator's regard for the legatee must be presumed
to continue until death (expounded in Tifft v. Porter, but ignored in
Matter of Security Trust Company) is not thus infringed; for the
testator himself proves that regard by holding the stock, available to
satisfy his legacy. Judicial concern to save the legatee the consequence
of possible ademption is then superfluous: the testator has prevented
ademption.6 7 Insistence upon this presumption, this judicial inference
'favorable' to the legatee, in Liell's Will, deprived the legatee of income 168
In Vogel v. Saunders, that inference 'in her favor' would have deprived
the legatee of her stock-if the minority had prevailed."9 As the primary
ON
iTARIES
testator, unless a contrary intention appear in the will." 1 ALEXMADER, COaMf
WiLLs 283, referring not to persons or beneficiaries, but to subject matter. See also, 3
WoaRNER ADMNmISmmAnoN 1396. Compare, (from ALEXANDER'S footnote) Smith v. Edlngton, 8 Cranch 66 (1814); Thorndike v. Reynolds, 22 Gratt. 21, 32 (Va. 1872). Contra, as
to specific bequests, Bradley's Estate, 119 Misc. 2, 194 N. Y. Supp. 888 (Surr. Ct. 1922),
citing Delaney's Will, 133 App. Div. 409, 117 N. Y. Supp. 838 (2d Dep't 1909), afl'd, 196
N. Y. 530, 89 N. E. 1098 (1909).
(b) "It is immaterial whether the property given is described as being part of the
testator's estate at the time of the making of the will, but to be a specific legacy It is
essential that the property be owned by the testator at the time of his death, and that it
be so described that it can be distinguished from the rest of his estate." Baker v. Baker,
319 Ill. 320, 150 N. E. 284 (1915), quoted in Vogel v. Saunders. See, to like effect,
Griffith v. Adams, 106 Conn. 19, 137 AtI. 20 (1927); Wood Estate, 267 Pa. 462, 110 Atl.
90 (1920); compare, Smith v. Smith, 192 N. C. 687, 135 S. E. 855 (1926).
(c) One may make a specific bequest of stock he does not possess, but hopes or Intends to acquire. Gardner v. Printup, 2 Barb. 83 (N. Y. 1847); It re Good's Estate, 145
Misc. 431, 260 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Accord: In re Horn, 317 Pa. 49,
175 At. 414 (1934); Sparks v. Weedon, 21 Md. 156 (1863). See, Wood's Estate, 267 Pa.
462, 110 At. 90 (1920). Contra: Woodworth's Estate, 31 Cal. 195 (1866); Pearce v. Billings, 10 R. I. 102 (1871).
(d) A bequest of "all shares of stock of which I may die possessed" is not specific,
Matter of Bergen, 56 Misc. 92, 106 N. Y. Supp. 1038 (Surr. Ct. 1907); contra: Wilson's
Estate, 85 Oregon 604, 619-20 (1917). Compare, In re Bonesteel, 265 N. Y. 455, 193
N. E. 268 (1934). See also, 2 L. C. Eq. 608; and-10 ANx. CAS. 498.
67. "He actually owned thirty-three $1,000 Fourth Liberty Loan bonds at the time
of the execution of. his will, and retained them in his possession to the time of his death,
thus negativing the idea that he entertained the intention to adeem any portion of the
bonds." Calnane's Estate, 28 S. W. (2d) 420, 422 (Mo. App. 1930). And see, In re Black,
223 Pa. 382, 72 Atl. 631 (1909).
68. See note 34, supra. The court in Liell's case might have reached a 'ight conclusion
by adopting the theory that such stock bequest is a demonstrative legacy, where testator
owned stock of the kind and amount bequeathed at date of will. This does conflict with
the holding in Tifft v. Porter, but not with the quotable reasoning for which that case
is principally noted. Possession of the stock at date of will, under this theory, warrants
an inference that the testator expected that stock "which he then had would remain in
his possession until he died, and then seve to carry out his will, still it does not follow that
he invalidate the bequest .... Such a bequest is consequently demonstrative, not specific."
2 W. & T. L. C. EQ. 647. Cf., id., 610. Vogel v. Saunders might be considered as in accord
with this theory.
69. 92 F. (2d) 984 (App. D. C. 1937). The minority say: "Because the testatrix thus
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reason for said presumption is absent whenever the stocks bequeathed
are retained by the testator until his death, the presumption should not
arise, in such case, to plague the legatee it was invefited to aid!"°
Instead, in such case, the court should extend itself to find in
the four corners of the will "some expression" of an intent to bequeath
these specific shares, sufficient to conform to the holding in Tifft v.
Porter. Otherwise, the legatee should be told that her bequest is a
general bequest-not upon any speculation about whether testator desired her to have the bonds in any event, or only if they remained in
his possession,-but upon the frank position that, the testator's intention
being unknown, and it being unnecessary to save the legatee from the
consequence of the legal doctrine of ademption, the court will, nevertheless, hold the bequest to be general, because of a judicial preference
to maintain quality among legatees, in accord with a (gratuitously)
presumed intent of all testators to that effect. This, if somewhat arbitrary, is yet forthright and understandable. It would be justified only
in the utter absence of any "words" indicating a contrary intent.
Notwithstanding Freeman's Will and Liell's Will, further recognition
of a change in what had once been considered the scope and purport of
Tifft v. Porter came later in the same year in In re Hebbard's Will.7'
Testator's wife, who predeceased him, had bequeathed certain securities
to her grandniece if her husband (testator) failed to survive her by six
felt especially generous towards this legatee the rule intended to incree the chance of
benefit under a will is held not to apply. An exactly opposite result would be more
sensible."
70. (a) The other considerations which cause the courts to favor a construction that
a legacy is general having to do with income, abatement, and equality among le-atee, are
well recognized to be secondary considerations. Johnson v. Conover, 54 N. J. Eq. 333,
35 Atl. 291 (1896); see Mandelle's Estate, 252 Mich. 375, 378, 233 N. W. 230, 231 (1930);
Burnett v. Heinlichs, 95 N. J. Eq. 112, 116, 122 At]. 681, 683 (1923).
(b) (1) Of the three reported cases found involving the question whether bcquests
of closely held stock are, per se, specific, two are contra to New York cases. Opinions in
both cases are considered weak. In Yerkes Estate, note 1, supra, the court stressd the
above secondary considerations leading courts to favor tagging a legacy as general. The
court said: "For these reasons, and because of the presumption in favor of equality, a
gift will be )regarded as general unless all the requisites of a specific legacy are manifest.
A legacy of stock, even though the number of shares is an odd one corresponding exactly
to the number owned by the testator, and though the stock itself is not generally found
in the market is not specific. Hawkins on Wills *301." 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 84. No other authority is cited; and the Hawkins test shows he had reference to ownership by testator
only at date of will; and that he admits that Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 3 Ath. 120 (1743) is

contra.
(2) In Cummings Estate, 12 Pa. Ct. Rep. 45 (1890) the court said: "Moreover, the
existing ownership must be shown by the will itself, either expressly by the use of my,
mine, etc., or, impliedly, by a direction to transfer, etc.; the will cannot be supplemented
by extrinsic evidence."
71. 142 Misc. 41, 253 N. Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
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months, otherwise to him. The six months would have expired September 3, 1930, and on August 28, 1930, testator made a codicil (modifying
a will which gave all his estate to his relatives) giving to said grandniece of his deceased wife, "the securities described below: 30 shares,
American Telegraph & Telephone Company", etc. He then listed, similarly, by number of shares and name of the company, the securities he
was bequeathing. These securities were not otherwise identified, but were
identical in amount and description with those bequeathed by his wife,
as above. Testator died January 2, 1931; and his said bequest of stock
was held to be specific. 7 2 The grandniece otherwise would have lost the
securities. Slater, Surrogate, wrote:
"The executors depend upon Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516, to support their
contention that the legacies are general ....
The authority of Tifft v. Porter
appears to be challenged by the decision of the same court in Matter of Martin's
Will, 252 N. Y. 582, although followed in Matter of Freeman's Estate, 139
Misc. Rep. 301."781
Continuing, Surrogate Slater says that Matter of Martin's Will,
"has been followed by Surrogate Foley in Matter of Tyler, New York Law
Journal, August 2, 1930, where the gift was of 38 shares of stock of the Corn
Exchange Bank. At the time of the death of the decedent, in the Tyler Case,
he owned 40 shares of bank stock. The surrogate held that the bequest was
specific as to the 38 shares of stock, citing Matter of Martin's Will, supra."74
Six days after In re Hebbard'sWill, just above, decision was rendered
in In re Malone's Estate.75 By her will, the testatrix bequeathed one
share of American Telegraph and Telephone Company stock to a hospital, one share to a church, one share to her aunt, and then provided that
three shares are to be sold and divided evenly between named children.
She then added,
"I would suggest that the executor hold this American Telephone and Telegraph
Company stock until after the next stock issue (if there should be one this year)
and take advantage of the rights which will be issued, that is, sell them, and
add the money to the above amount to be given to the children.1 70
The testatrix sold this stock in her lifetime. The gift however was
saved to the legatees by the finding of the surrogate that the legacy was
72. Compare the curiously similar facts upon which a contrary decision war given
in Skipwith v. Cabell, 19 Gratt. 758, 791 (Va. 1870), relying upon Tifft v. Porter, and
Davis v. Cain, I Iredell 304 (N. C. 1840).
73. See 142 Misc. 41, 42, 43, 253 N. Y. Supp. 519, 522, 523 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
74. See id., at 42, 253 N. Y. Supp. at 522.
75. 143 Misc. 657, 257 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
76. See id. at 658, 257 N. Y. Supp. at 838. (Italics supplied.)
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general. No notice is taken of the words italicized above.77 Tifft v. Porter
is cited, quoted and blithely followed:
"While the authority of that case has been challenged, the general rule stated
therein is firmly established
in the jurisprudence of this state. Mattcr of
78
Freeman's Estate."
As to the bequests to the hospital, to the church, and to the aunt, the
Surrogate says that,
"the testatrix has simply made a general bequest of stocks, to be satisfied in
kind .....
The gift of the remaining three shares must be regarded as a general
legacy, and9 in the event of insufficiency of assets, all the legacies must abate
pro rata. 7
Again the gift was saved for the legatees upon the authority of Tifft v.
Porter. But this decision is not supported by the holding in that case.
Moreover, this surrogate overlooked the fact that the rule applied in
Tifft v. Porter was very much curtailed in scope by the Security Trust
Company case. For there the Court of Appeals quoted, with approval:
"the fact that the testator had the number of shares so given, though
not controlling, is significant," and "a very slight indication of an
intention to give shares then in his ownership is enough to make the
legacy specific in a case like this." From the words of her will, quoted
above, it is clear that this testatrix anticipated that death might overtake her within a year; that she owned stock which she was bequeathing,
with direction that her executor "hold this... stock until after the next
stock issue (if there should be one this year)" etc. Even the holding
in Tifft v. Porter that, in addition to possession at date of will, there
must be "some expression" indicating an intent to give the stocks then
held, was here fully satisfied. In re Liell's Will was an arbitrary decision
in favor of equality of legatees.8 0 it re Malones Estate was an even
more arbitrary decision to save the legatees the consequence of
ademption.8 '
77. (a) Although stock be given in general terms, if the testator directs a sale for the
benefit of the legatee, the legacy will be held specific. Ashton v. Ashton, Cas. tern. Tal. 152,
25 Eng. Rep. 712 (1735); 3 P. Wins. 3S4. Compare, Plant v. Donaldon, 39 App. D. C.
162, 40 W. L. R. 749; Purfield's Estate, 159 Misc. 824, 289 N. Y. Supp. 297 (Surr. Ct.
1936).
(b) See cases note 15, supra, that a bequest of a balance of stock made prior bequests
of the same stock specific.
78. See 143 Misc. 657, 659, 257 N. Y. Supp. 837, 839 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
79. See id.
So. See text at page 376, note 56.
81. (a) Thus we have correlative examples of the extent to which the courts go in
denominating a legacy as general under the influence of the opinion in Tifit v. Porter:
Holding a bequest general (to avoid ademption) when the stock has hen dispocd of, as
in Malone's Estate, 143 Misc. 657, 257 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Surr. Ct. 1931), and holding a
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When the next case arose two years later, the proposition that testamentary gifts of stock owned by testator, of a closely held corporation,
are specific bequests, was recognized as established. And Tifft v. Porter
is not mentioned. The facts must be pieced together from two reports
of the case. Testator owned forty-six of the entire fifty shares of the
capital stock of a trucking company. By paragraph three of his will, he
bequeathed one share of the stock of said corporation, each, to four
employees, without using "my" or any equivalent expression. He also
provided for sale of forty-two shares of said stock to named legatees
at $75,000. Sale to them at a lower figure was first approved.82 Subsequently, the court held, as to the four employees:
"The legacies of the stock provided for in paragraph third are specific. The
fact that the testator owned practically all of the capital stock of the corporation, coupled with its non-public character, brings the gift within the rule laid
down in 3 Matter of Security Trust Company . . . and Matter of Mitchell's

Estate."

Likewise, later, in a decision under which realty devised by the residuary clause of testator's will became liable for payment of his general
legacies, another surrogate followed the same rule. 4 Louis Comfort
Tiffany owned 890 shares of non par stock of Tiffany and Company
when his will was executed June 17, 1921, and thereafter until his death.
He bequeathed four hundred shares, without using "my" or any equivalent adjective, and the balance of the said stock passed with his residuary
estate to his children for life, remainder to their issue. He provided by
codicil, "I wish all my specific and general legatees to receive their
legacies free and clear of all ... taxes." Taxes were directed to be paid
'
"out of my residuary estate."85
Surrogate Howell points out that this reference to specific legacies
bequest general (to maintain equality among legatees) when the stock has been retained,
as in Liell's Will, note 56, supra. Often, as in these cases, the words of the will are supplanted by the will of the court in effectuating an intent not evidenced by the will, nor
warranted by the facts, but gratuitously presumed. Blair v. Scribner, et at., 67 N. J. Eq.
583, 60 AtI. 211 (1905).
(b) Curiously, Vogel v. Saunders, note 11, supra, saved the legacy to the legatee (where
stock had been retained, in part, but was endangered by creditor's claims) by holding the
bequest to be specific. They distinguish the "reason" of the rule of Tifft v. Porter as inapplicable. Actually, they distinguished the letter of that reason and followed its spirit]
And the facts justified them in so doing. Compare note 53, supra.
82. In re Beecroft's Estate, 143 Misc. 637, 257 N. Y. Supp. 846 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
83. In re Beecroft's Estate, 146 Misc. 344, 347, 263 N. Y. Supp. 142, 146 (Surr. Ct.
1933).
84. In re Tiffany's Estate, 157 Misc. 873, 285 N. Y. Supp. 971 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
85. See id., at 889, 285 N. Y. Supp. at 989. A similar provision was deemed decisive
to make the bequest specific in Cramer v. Cramer, 35 Misc. 17, 71 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup.
Ct. 1901).
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could mean only the bequest of Tiffany and Company stock, and he
points out also that, under the will, except for a bequest to a nurse of
the income for life on fifty shares thereof, all said stock went to testator's
family, or to a foundation he had created, the trustees of which were
forbidden to sell the stock until it had first been offered to the directors
of Tiffany and Company. In addition, following the tenor of Matter
of Security Trust Company, he then says:
"'The Tiffany & Company stock was never listed on any stock exchange, never
had any 'over the counter' market, and was never procurable in any general
market. It was always a closely held family stock, and at testator's death
about one-third of it was owned by the Tiffany family and the balance by two
other families. . . . I find that testator intended to bequeath the stock in
Tiffany & Company that he owned and that consequently the legacies are
specific. It follows that the specific legatees of that stock are entitled to be
paid in full, and that they likewise are entitled to receive the dividends." 80
Finally the attitude of the Appellate Division is shown in the case
of Filor's Estate. Testator gave "the proceeds of my life insurance
policy of $25,000" to his mother, or if she predeceased him to his
brothers and sisters. He also gave an annuity of $1,000 to his mother,
residue to his wife and children. Thereafter he changed the beneficiary
of the insurance policy from his estate to his wife. Later, by codicil, he
gave additional bequests of $5,000 each to his four brothers and sisters,
and otherwise specifically confirmed his will. He left a net estate of
$500,000. Sherwood, Surrogate, (following the spirit of the reasoning
in Tifft v. Porter) held the mother "entitled to receive" $25,000 from
the estate, and quoted the Tifft case.8 T
This decision was reversed by the Appellate Division May 10, 1935.
They held the bequest to be "a specific legacy and not a demonstrative
legacy" and, in an opinion written per curiam, they added:
"The case of Tifft v. Porter is not to the contrary, and the authority of that
case is seriously impaired, if not destroyed by In re Security Trust Company
of Rochester, 221 N. Y. 313, 320, 116 N. E. 1006."' 88
Thus we find that the decisions in LieU's Will and in Malone's Estate,
and the opinion in Freeman's Will, deny that Tifft v. Porter has been
impaired. Matter of Hastings, Strasenburgh's Will, Mitchell's Estate,
Beecroft's Estate and Tiffany's Estate each and all involved closely held
stock. The decisions in Hebbard's Will and in Matter of Tyler are
86. See 157 Misc. 873, 876, 285 N. Y. Supp. 971, 975; and id., at 891, 285 N. Y. Supp.
at 991.
87. In re For's Estate, 154 Misc. 596, 278 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
88. 244 App. Div. 80, 279 N. Y. Supp. 784 (3d Dep't 1935), aF'd, without opinion,
268 N. Y. 674, 198 N. E. 553 (1935).
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grounded upon the proposition, as stated by the dicta of the Appellate
Division in Filor'sEstate, that the authority of Tifft v. Porter has been
"seriously impaired if not destroyed." What conclusions follow?
The precise holding in Tifft v. Porter,that possession by the testator
at the date of his will, and at the date of his death,8" of "stocks or shares
in public funds" of equal or larger amount than his legacy will not of
itself make the bequest specific, and that there must be, in addition,
"some expression" of intent to give those stocks,--remains, unimpaired.
But the rule followed in Tifft v. Porter that legacies are to be presumed to be general, has been materially confined and restricted in
application. The weight to be given to the fact of continued possession
of the stock has been increased. The requisite further showing in "words"
of an intent to give those stocks (and thus create a specific legacy) has
been diminished,--almost to the vanishing pointl This was done first
by the action of the Court of Appeals in the Security Trust Company
case in going to the opinions of courts which have held more "liberal"
views, to find and adopt new principles for its guidance; and, second,
by the construction, in that case, that Tifft v. Porter "goes no further
than to hold that a gift of stock is a general legacy when there is
nothing in the will to indicate that it is a gift of the testator's stock."
The force of this construction has been both elucidated and emphasized
by the memorandum opinion in Matter of Will of Martin. The extent
to which this construction may lead, is illustrated by the recent decision,
in another jurisdiction, in Vogel v. Saunders. There the stock was retained in part and the bequest was held specific on the ground that the
"reason" of the rule favoring general legacies did not apply when the
stock was retained. The court did also rely upon "words" in the will
which referred to the legatee, but which had no reference to the stock.
Regardless of the presumption favoring general legacies, bequests of
stock of a closely held corporation should be held to be specific, without
"my")or an equivalent expression, whenever the testator holds a majority
of said stock at the date of the execution of his will, and retains it until
his death. Probably such legacies should be held specific, even when
the testator's holding is less than a controlling interest, provided the
stock is in fact closely held, as distinguished from stocks obtainable on
the market. In either case, disposing of part during testator's lifetime
should cause an abatement pro tanto among these specific legacies.00
And when the holder of a block of stock not replaceable on the market
(and therefore unique through scarcity) bequeathes it, and later disposes
89. See note 4, supra.
90. Drake v. True, 72 N. H. 322, 56 AtI. 749 (1903) approved in Matter of Security
Trust Company, quoted in text at p. 000, sura, note 25. Also, cases cited from Strasenburgh's Will, note 35, supra.
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of it, voluntarily or involuntarily, the bequest should be held adeemed,
as it would be absurd to consider that the testator expected his executor
to go out and buy stock which the testator well knew could not be bought,
in any ordinary way.9 '
Tifft v. Porter though not overruled, has been modified. But the
bequests of stock of family, or otherwise closely held, corporations, do
not depend for decision upon this modification. They stand upon the
distinct ground that they involve unique subject-matter; and, therefore,
they are entirely outside the scope of the Tifft case, and constitute an
exception to it. Thus the alternate questions stated in the above title
cannot be satisfied by a single answer. Each must be answered in the
affirmative.
This modification of the principles announced in the opinion in Tifft
v. Porterplaces New York more nearly in accord with those jurisdictions,
including Massachusetts, 2 New Hampshire, 3 Rhode Island,"4 Indiana,"3
Illinois,"8 Missouri,97 and Pennsylvania, 8 where, as to stock legacies,
previously there had been a break from the "iron-clad rule of 'my' as
that rule is followed in England, and, in America, in New Jersey" and
in Colorado. 00 More recently, as noted, that rule was avoided by distinguishing and thus limiting its application, in a noteworthy case in
the District of Columbia. And the corroding force of distinction and
limitation, applied to Tifft v. Porter in New York, weakens to that
extent the keystone of the arch upon which "the 'my' rule" is built in
Alabama, 10 in California,' 12 in Iowa,10 3 in Virginia,10 and in Wisconsin. 103 That other jurisdictions may refer to these developments and
91. Quotations: from Matter of Hastings, New Albany Trust Company v. Powell, and
Freeman's Will, in text at p. 000, notes 30 and 32, supra.
92. Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mlass. 98, 85 N. E. 86S (1903); Unitarian Society v. Tufts,
151 Mass. 76, 23 N. E. 1006 (1890).
93. See note 90, supra.
94. See note 26, supra.
95. New Albany Trust Company v. Powell, 29 Ind. App. 494, 64 N. E. 640 (1902).
320, 42 A. L. R. 1514 (1925).
96. Baker v. Baker, 319 UL1.
97. Matter of Largue, note 21, supra.
98. Ferreck's Estate, note 22, supra.
99. Blair v. Scribner, 67 N. J.Eq. 583, 60 At!. 211 (Ig05); Whitlock v. Blawenbaxg,
2 N. J.Misc. 419 (1924); Garrabant v. Callaway, 110 N. J.Eq. 88, 91, 158 At. 830, 831
(1932).
100. Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P. (2d) 311 (1932).
101. Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9 (1868).
102. Matter of Bernal, 165 Cal. 223, 232, 132 Pac. 375, 379 (1913).
103. Evans v. Hunter, 86 Iowa 413, 53 N. W. 277 (1892).
104. Skipwith v. Cabell, 19 Gratt. 758, 791 (Va. 1870).
105. In re Blomdahl's Will, 216 Vris. 590, 257 N. W. 152 (1934) which Velies upon
Evans v. Hunter, note 103, supra, and upon Liell's Will, note 56, supra, both of which are
bottomed on Tifft v. Porter.
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similarly modify their own position, eventually, is indicated by the misgivings with which the "iron-clad" English rule was adopted by them. 106
106. In Dryden v. Owings, 49 Md. 356 (1878), another leading American case, in
which a stock legacy was held general because the testator had not used "my" and although
he owned stock of the kind and amount bequeathed, both at the date of his will and at
the time of his death, Robinson, J. said: "Were this a case of first impression . . . I
should not hesitate to say he meant to give the legatee these identical bonds." The court
relied chiefly upon Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515. In Kunkel v. MacGill, 56 Md. 120
(1881) the court held similar bequests to be specific, where some clauses of the will contained the word "my" and testator died very soon after executing the will. Again the
court's opinion was written by Robinson, J. This time he wrote: "I was inclined to the
opinion that the legacy was specific in that case (Dryden v. Owings) and the doubts then
entertained have not been weakened by the further consideration of the subject."
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